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HAND OVER YOUR TAX ACCRUAL 
WORKPAPERS: THE FIRST CIRCUIT IN 
UNITED STATES V. TEXTRON EXPOSES DUAL-
PURPOSE DOCUMENTS TO DISCOVERY 
Abstract: On August 13, 2009, the First Circuit in United States v. Textron 
Inc. held that tax accrual workpapers are not protected from discovery 
under the attorney work-product privilege. In so doing, the court eviscer-
ated the last line of protection for dual-purpose tax documents from the 
prying eyes of the IRS and opposing parties in litigation. 
Introduction 
 In the wake of Enron and other corporate financial scandals, cor-
porate taxpayers have been increasingly subject to government regula-
tion.1 Recently, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has concentrated 
on tax shelters—corporate transactions designed to avoid tax liabili-
ties.2 Tax shelters deprive the U.S. Treasury of a large source of reve-
nue and contribute to the federal budget deficit.3 To detect tax shel-
ters, the IRS now frequently requests disclosure of corporate taxpayers’ 
tax-related documents.4 Corporate taxpayers, however, are reluctant to 
provide this information freely and have tried to shield their tax docu-
ments from discovery by using various legal doctrines including the at-
torney-client privilege, the tax practitioner-client privilege, and, re-
cently, the attorney work-product privilege.5 
                                                                                                                      
 
1 See Michelle M. Henkel, The Pursuit of Transparency Does Not Trump the Work Product 
Privilege, 60 Tax Executive 175, 175 (2008); Michael L. Seigel, Corporate America Fights 
Back: The Battle Over Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 2–3 (2008). 
2 See Tracy A. Kaye, The Regulation of Corporate Tax Shelters in the United States, 58 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 585, 585, 587 (2010). 
3 See id. at 587. In 2001, the IRS estimated that corporate tax shelters constituted $10 
to $15 billion of the $30 billion in unreported corporate income taxes. Id. 
4 See Andrew Golodny, Lawyers Versus Auditors: Disclosure to Auditors and Potential Waiver 
of Work-Product Privilege in United States v. Textron, 61 Tax Law. 621, 621 (2008); Paul 
McCord, Circling Sharks: Toward a Better Understanding of the Tax Lawyer’s Role Under Circular 
230, FIN 48 and the Work-Product Doctrine, 34 Mich. Tax Law. 26, 26 (2008). 
5 See Philip N. Jones, First Circuit in Textron Gives IRS Access to Tax Accrual Workpapers, 
111 J. Tax’n 199, 199 (2009). The attorney-client privilege and tax practitioner-client privi-
lege generally are not successful defenses in these cases. Id. They are usually waived in tax 
return litigation involving corporate taxpayers that show their tax documents to inde-
pendent auditors. See, e.g., United States v. Textron Inc. (Textron I ), 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 
1 
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 In August 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, sit-
ting en banc, decided United States v. Textron Inc. and the issue of 
whether a corporate taxpayer’s tax accrual workpapers are protected 
under the limited attorney work-product privilege.6 The en banc court, 
reversing the decisions of the district court and a First Circuit panel, 
held that Textron’s tax accrual workpapers were not privileged under 
the work-product doctrine and granted the IRS a monumental win.7 
The court based its ruling on its conclusion that tax accrual workpapers 
are prepared for business purposes, not for litigation.8 It also expressed 
a desire to support the IRS.9 
 Taxpayers and practitioners have voiced sharp outcry in the wake 
of the Textron decision.10 One concern is that the IRS now has an unfair 
advantage in tax return litigation.11 More broadly, any adversary, not 
just the IRS, may now access an opponent’s tax accrual workpapers.12 
The Textron decision, however, is unlikely to be short-lived, as the U.S. 
Supreme Court denied certiorari in May 2010.13 Additionally, the IRS 
has continued to demand transparency and disclosure and is unlikely 
to cease requesting tax accrual workpapers.14 
 This Comment begins in Part I with an overview of the First Cir-
cuit’s en banc decision in Textron.15 Part II then discusses the majority’s 
reasoning and the heavy emphasis the decision placed on IRS’s inter-
                                                                                                                      
151 (D.R.I. 2007) (noting that the tax practitioner-client and attorney-client privileges are 
waived by disclosure of privileged items to a third party). 
6 United States v. Textron Inc. (Textron II ), 577 F.3d 21, 22 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3320 (2010). For a description of tax accrual workpapers, see infra 
notes 22–27 and accompanying text. 
7 See Textron II, 577 F.3d at 26. 
8 See id. 
9 See id. at 30. 
10 See William E. Massey, Supreme Court Will Not Review First Circuit’s Textron Decision, 21 
J. Int’l Tax’n 9, 9–11 (2010). Eleven amicus curiae briefs were filed with the Supreme 
Court encouraging it to hear the Textron case, criticizing the First Circuit’s standard and 
expressing fear of the standard’s effect on the use of tax counsel. Id.; see also Jerald David 
August & Jason M. Grimes, The Discovery Status of Tax Accrual Workpapers After Textron, Bus. 
Entities, Jan./Feb. 2010, at 10 (“[T]he First Circuit’s decision and underlying rationale 
has and will continue to receive a stentorian cry of ‘no thank you’ from tax lawyers, tax 
managers, and in-house counsel to public and private corporations and companies . . . .”). 
11 See Textron I, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 155. 
12 See Federal Tax Coordinator 2d, ¶ T-1330 (RIA 2010). 
13 See Textron Inc. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 3320 (2010). 
14 See McCord, supra note 4, at 28. In 2010, the IRS announced that it is developing a 
schedule requiring certain corporate taxpayers to report uncertain tax positions on their 
tax returns. See I.R.S. Announcement 2010-9, 2010-7 I.R.B. 408 (Feb. 16, 2010); I.R.S. An-
nouncement 2010-17, 2010-13 I.R.B. 515 (Mar. 29, 2010). 
15 See infra notes 18–72 and accompanying text. 
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ests in revenue collection.16 Finally, Part III argues that, as a result of 
the desire to support the IRS, the Textron majority created an overly 
narrow, tax-centric work-product standard that fits poorly in the broad-
er scope of attorney work-product.17 
I. Tax Accrual Workpapers and the Work-Product Privilege: 
What They Are and How the Textron Court  
Considered Them in Tandem 
A. Tax Reporting Requirements and Tax Accrual Workpapers 
 Federal securities laws require publicly traded corporations like 
Textron to obtain audited financial statements annually from inde-
pendent accounting firms.18 This audit typically requires an accountant 
to issue a favorable, or “clean,” opinion letter, which certifies that the 
company’s financial statements fairly represent the company’s financial 
condition.19 Prior to issuing this opinion letter, accountants usually re-
quest to view the company’s tax returns so that they can identify transac-
tions that may result in tax liabilities, or “contingencies,” if challenged 
by the IRS.20 The company must quantify these contingencies and set 
aside enough money in reserve to satisfy them.21 
 Tax accrual workpapers are often used to determine the size of a 
company’s reserves by analyzing the tax impact of completed transac-
tions.22 Although there is no standard definition for tax accrual work-
papers, the IRS defines them as 
those audit workpapers, whether prepared by the taxpayer, 
the taxpayer’s accountant, or the independent auditor, that 
                                                                                                                      
16 See infra notes 73–86 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 87–106 and accompanying text. 
18 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l, 78m (2006) (requiring balance sheets to be certified by a public 
accounting firm if so required by regulation and permitting the SEC to promulgate asset 
and liability reporting rules); 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-01 to .12-19 (2009). Companies may also 
have to obtain clean opinion letters for other reasons. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 
F.2d 530, 534 n.3 (5th Cir. 1982) (observing that the New York Stock Exchange and certain 
banks may require companies to undergo audits and maintain reserves for contingencies). 
19 Jones, supra note 5, at 199. 
20 Id. As the First Circuit noted in Textron, the requirement that auditors examine the 
company’s tax accrual workpapers is based on a number of promulgated auditing stan-
dards. See United States v. Textron Inc. (Textron II ), 577 F.3d 21, 23 n.1 (1st Cir. 2009) (en 
banc). 
21 Jones, supra note 5, at 199. 
22 See Christian M. Hoffman & Matthew C. Baltay, Maintaining Client Confidences: Devel-
opments at the Supreme Judicial Court and First Circuit in 2009, Bos. B. J., Fall 2009, at 20, 22. 
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relate to the tax reserve for current, deferred and potential or 
contingent tax liabilities . . . and to footnotes disclosing those 
tax reserves on audited financial statements. These workpa-
pers reflect an estimate of a company’s tax liabilities and may 
also be referred to as the tax pool analysis, tax liability contin-
gency analysis, tax cushion analysis, or tax contingency reserve 
analysis.23 
Tax accrual workpapers often also include “hazard-of-litigation” per-
centages, or percentage estimates of the IRS’s chances of success if it 
challenges a debatable return item.24 
 Tax accrual workpapers are thus a valuable resource to the IRS.25 
They enable the IRS to “pinpoint the ‘soft spots’ on a corporation’s tax 
return by highlighting those areas in which the corporate taxpayer has 
taken a position that may, at some later date, require the payment of 
additional taxes.”26 They also essentially allow the IRS to know exactly 
how much a corporate taxpayer is willing to pay to settle each disput-
able transaction, given the hazard-of-litigation analyses.27 
B. The Attorney Work-Product Privilege 
 The attorney work-product privilege was first articulated in the 
landmark U.S. Supreme Court case of Hickman v. Taylor in 1947.28 The 
privilege is now codified in Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.29 The rule protects fact and opinion work-product produced 
“in anticipation of litigation or for trial” by a party’s lawyer or represen-
tative.30 A party may waive this privilege.31 An opposing party may over-
                                                                                                                      
 
23 Audit Workpapers, Tax Accrual Workpapers, and Tax Reconciliation Workpapers 
Defined, IRM 4.10.20.2 ( July 12, 2004). For an overview of cases discussing the discovery 
status of tax accrual workpapers and the different labels that have been applied to such 
workpapers, see generally August & Grimes, supra note 10, at 18–27. 
24 See United States v. Textron Inc. (Textron I ), 507 F. Supp. 2d 138, 142 (D.R.I. 2007). 
25 See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 813 (1984). In 2002, the IRS 
announced that it would begin requesting tax accrual workpapers if taxpayers engaged in 
listed transactions. I.R.S. Announcement 2002–63, 2002–27 I.R.B. 72 ( July 8, 2002). A 
listed transaction is one that the IRS has identified as being the same as or substantially 
similar to a tax avoidance transaction. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2) (2005). 
26 Arthur Young, 465 U.S. at 813. 
27 See Henkel, supra note 1, at 176. 
28 329 U.S. 495, 510–12 (1947). 
29 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). 
30 See id. 
31 See Textron I, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 152 (“[D]isclosures that are inconsistent with keep-
ing the [protected] information from an adversary constitute a waiver of the work product 
privilege.”); Henkel, supra note 1, at 179–80 (discussing waiver in non-tax and tax cases). 
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come the privilege by showing a substantial need for the work-product 
and an inability to obtain the material without undue hardship.32 
 Rule 26(b)(3) allows attorneys to prepare a case properly without 
undue interference from an opposing party.33 Litigation requires that 
attorneys gather information, sift through facts to determine what in-
formation is relevant, and prepare legal theories.34 The Hickman Court 
recognized that, if work-product were available to opposing parties, 
much of what is currently written in case preparation would remain 
unwritten to the detriment of the legal profession.35 Moreover, the ad-
versarial system would be undermined if parties had access to an oppos-
ing party’s thoughts and strategies regarding litigation.36 
 The Supreme Court has not defined when documents are pre-
pared “in anticipation of litigation,” so two tests had developed by the 
time of Textron to determine which documents qualify.37 The Fifth Cir-
cuit employs a “primary purpose” test that analyzes whether “the pri-
mary motivating purpose behind the creation of the document was to 
aid in possible future litigation.”38 Most courts, including the First Cir-
cuit, however, have adopted a “because of” test.39 This test asks “if ‘in 
light of the nature of the document and the factual situation in the par-
ticular case, the document can fairly be said to have been prepared or 
obtained because of the prospect of litigation.’”40 Under the “because of” 
test, a document receives work-product protection if it was created be-
                                                                                                                      
See generally Jean A. Pawlow & Kevin Spencer, Adrift in a Sea of Uncertainty: Tax Accrual Work-
papers Are Work-Product . . . but Showing Them to Your Auditor May Waive the Protection, 61 Tax 
Executive 33 (2009) (discussing waiver of work-product protection, particularly in the 
context of the Textron district court decision). 
32 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii). 
33 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510. 
34 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511. 
35 Id. 
36 See id. 
37 Henkel, supra note 1, at 176; see Textron II, 577 F.3d at 26; see also Jones, supra note 5, 
at 199–200 (providing an overview of the status of work-product law at the time of Textron). 
38 El Paso, 682 F.2d at 542 (quoting United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 
1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
39 See United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1202 (2d Cir. 1998) (first adopting the 
test as originally articulated in 8 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & 
Procedure § 2024, at 343 (1994)); accord United States v. Roxworthy, 457 F.3d 590, 594 
(6th Cir. 2006); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 357 F.3d 900, 907 (9th Cir. 2004); PepsiCo, 
Inc. v. Baird, Kurtz & Dobson LLP, 305 F.3d 813, 817 (8th Cir. 2002); Maine v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Interior, 298 F.3d 60, 68 (1st Cir. 2002); Montgomery County v. MicroVote Corp., 175 F.3d 
296, 305 (3d Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Lutheran Soc. Servs., 186 F.3d 959, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1999); 
Logan v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 971, 976–77 (7th Cir. 1996). 
40 Adlman, 134 F.3d at 1202 (citing Wright et al., supra note 39, at 343). 
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cause of anticipated litigation and would not have been created in a 
substantially similar form but for the prospect of litigation.41 
 The Supreme Court has not directly ruled on whether the attorney 
work-product privilege protects tax accrual workpapers.42 In 1984, in 
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., however, the Court ruled that the 
accountant work-product privilege does not apply to tax accrual work-
papers.43 The IRS has used this decision to assert its right to obtain 
such workpapers in any situation.44 
                                                                                                                     
 Before Textron, only the Fifth Circuit had directly addressed 
whether tax accrual workpapers are protected under the attorney work-
product doctrine.45 In the 1982 case United States v. El Paso Co., the Fifth 
Circuit ruled that, under its “primary purpose” test, tax accrual work-
papers are not work-product.46 The court held that these workpapers 
were primarily created to “anticipate, for financial reporting purposes, 
what the impact of litigation might be on the company’s tax liability. 
[The corporate taxpayer] thus creates the tax pool analysis with an eye 
on its business needs, not on its legal ones.”47 Because the primary pur-
pose for creating these workpapers was to satisfy business needs, not to 
aid in litigation, they were not privileged.48 
C. Textron Challenges an IRS Summons 
 In 2003, the IRS audited Textron’s corporate income tax liability 
and determined that Textron had engaged in nine sale-in, lease-out 
(“SILO”) transactions.49 Because SILOs are listed “tax avoidance trans-
actions” under treasury regulations, the IRS issued an administrative 
summons to obtain all tax accrual workpapers for the years in ques-
 
41 Id. at 1195. 
42 See Textron II, 577 F.3d at 26. 
43 See 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984). 
44 See, e.g., I.R.S. Announcement 2002–63, 2002–27 I.R.B. 72 ( July 8, 2002) (“The Su-
preme Court confirmed the [IRS]’s right to obtain Tax Accrual Workpapers under its 
summons authority.”). 
45 Textron II, 577 F.3d at 30 (“[W]ork product protection for tax audit work papers has 
been squarely addressed only in two circuits: this one and the Fifth.”); see also El Paso, 682 
F.2d at 544. 
46 682 F.2d at 544. 
47 El Paso, 682 F.2d at 543. 
48 See id. 
49 Textron II, 577 F.3d at 23–24. SILOs allow tax-exempt organizations (“TEOs”) to 
transfer depreciation and interest deductions, from which the TEOs cannot benefit, to 
other taxpayers who use them to shelter income from tax. Id. at 24. Textron engaged in 
SILOs when it purchased equipment from a foreign utility or transit operator and leased it 
back to the seller on the same day. Id. at 23–24. 
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tion.50 Textron refused to provide these papers, citing work-product 
privilege, so the IRS filed an enforcement action in the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Rhode Island.51 
 The district court sided with Textron.52 The court applied the “be-
cause of” test and held that the tax accrual workpapers were work-
product.53 The court also held that the work-product protection was 
not waived when Textron submitted its workpapers to an independent 
accounting firm and that the IRS failed to demonstrate a substantial 
need for the workpapers.54 The IRS appealed the decision, and a First 
Circuit panel affirmed.55 The First Circuit then withdrew the panel’s 
decision when it voted to rehear the case en banc.56 
 In a 3-2 decision written by Judge Michael Boudin, the en banc 
court ruled that Textron’s tax accrual workpapers were not attorney 
work-product.57 The majority applied the “because of” test and decided 
that the documents were in fact “prepared to support financial filings 
and gain audit or approval” as required by securities laws and auditing 
requirements, and not because of the prospect of litigation.58 To sup-
port this analysis, the majority noted that the Hickman reasoning fo-
cused on protecting documents prepared for use in litigation.59 The 
majority also discussed an advisory committee note to Rule 26(b)(3) 
that approvingly cited cases denying work-product protection to docu-
                                                                                                                      
50 Id. at 24. Specifically, the contested documents included spreadsheets identifying each 
debatable return item, the dollar amount subject to potential dispute, and hazard-of-
litigation percentages. Id. at 23. The IRS also requested workpapers created by Textron’s 
independent auditor to determine the sufficiency of Textron’s reserves. Id. For a list of trans-
actions that the IRS considers “the same or substantially similar to . . . a tax avoidance trans-
action” see Listed Transactions—LB&I Tier Issues, IRS.gov, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/ 
corporations/article/0,,id=120633,00.html (last updated Nov. 4, 2010). 
51 See Textron I, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 141. Textron also asserted that the summons was is-
sued for an improper purpose and that the documents were also protected under the at-
torney-client and tax practitioner-client privileges. See id. at 141, 146. 
52 See id. at 141. The district court found that the documents were protected by the 
work-product privilege, though it also found that Textron waived any attorney-client or tax 
practitioner-client privilege when it provided its workpapers to its independent account-
ant. Id. at 152. 
53 Id. at 150. 
54 See id. at 154. 
55 See Textron II, 577 F.3d at 26. 
56 United States v. Textron Inc., 560 F.3d 513, 513 (1st Cir. 2009) (granting petition for 
rehearing en banc). 
57 See Textron II, 577 F.3d at 26. 
58 Id. at 31–32. 
59 Id. at 29; see Hickman, 329 U.S. at 497. 
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ments made because of regulations, even though those documents 
might have become the subject of litigation.60 
 The majority’s characterization of the dual nature of tax accrual 
workpapers was an integral factor in the denial of work-product protec-
tion.61 Although the workpapers referred to items that might ultimately 
be litigated, the majority opined that the business nature of tax accrual 
workpapers was obvious: 
Every lawyer who tries cases knows the touch and feel of ma-
terials prepared for a current or possible . . . law suit. . . . No 
one with experience of law suits would talk about tax accrual 
work papers in those terms. A set of tax reserve figures, calcu-
lated for purposes of accurately stating a company’s financial 
figures, has in ordinary parlance only that purpose: to support 
a financial statement and the independent audit of it.62 
Noting this characterization, and asserting that there was no strong evi-
dence to the contrary, the court also concluded that tax accrual work-
papers would not even be useful in litigation.63 Given this portrayal of 
the workpapers, it seemed logical that the workpapers would have been 
prepared in the ordinary course of business, regardless of the possibil-
ity of future litigation.64 
 In a sharp dissent, Judge Juan R. Torruella criticized the majority’s 
application of the “because of” test and argued that, if properly ap-
plied, the test would protect tax accrual workpapers as work-product.65 
Judge Torruella argued that the majority created and applied a new 
“prepared for” test that broke with precedent and was inconsistent with 
Rule 26(b)(3)’s text and purpose.66 The dissent then contrasted the 
scopes of the two tests.67 Although the traditional “because of” test ex-
amines the totality of the circumstances behind the creation of a doc-
                                                                                                                      
60 Textron II, 577 F.3d at 29 & n.7 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s note 
(1970)). 
61 See id. at 31–32. 
62 Id. at 30. 
63 See id. at 28. 
64 Id. Some scholars agree that tax accrual workpapers are disclosure documents, not 
litigation documents. See, e.g., Dennis J. Ventry Jr., A Primer on Tax Work Product for Federal 
Courts, 123 Tax Notes 875, 876 (2009) (“[T]ax accrual workpapers never qualify as pro-
tected work product. . . . They exist exclusively because of financial accounting and disclo-
sure requirements regardless of any prospect for future litigation.”). 
65 See Textron II, 577 F.3d at 38 (Torruella, J., dissenting). 
66 Id. at 32. 
67 See id. at 34. 
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ument, the majority’s formulation narrowly focused on whether the 
workpapers were prepared “for use” in possible litigation.68 
 Judge Torruella also criticized the majority’s characterization of 
tax accrual workpapers, arguing that the majority “misrepresent[ed] 
and ignore[d] the findings of the district court.”69 The proper role of 
an appellate court, he said, is to disregard a district court’s factual find-
ings only upon a showing of clear error.70 Judge Torruella repri-
manded the majority for “recharacteriz[ing] the facts as suit[ed] its 
purposes” and for not addressing the district court’s findings that dual 
purposes drove the creation of the workpapers.71 He also felt that the 
district court’s findings were correct—the workpapers served two pur-
poses, not only business purposes.72 
                                                                                                                     
II. The Textron Court’s Narrow Reasoning 
A. The Intended Scope of Rule 26(b)(3) 
 Although the Textron majority insisted that its “prepared for” test 
supported the purposes of Rule 26(b)(3), the majority’s construction of 
the rule is seemingly much narrower than the rule’s language.73 In his 
dissent, Judge Torruella argued that the majority’s interpretation of the 
rule rendered meaningless the “in anticipation of litigation” language 
 
68 See id. at 32, 40–41. 
69 Id. at 32. 
70 Id. at 39. 
71 Textron II, 577 F.3d at 39 (Torruella, J., dissenting). Those who support the major-
ity’s decision have noted, however, that the Textron district court never examined the privi-
leged documents through an in camera review, and based its decision solely on the plead-
ings and affidavits. See Ventry, supra note 64, at 883–84. The argument is that the district 
court failed to meet its fact-finding obligations. Id. Thus, its determination that certain 
documents were work-product is not reliable. See id. 
72 See Textron II, 577 F.3d at 39 (Torruella, J., dissenting). Some scholars agree with the 
dissent’s characterization of the workpapers. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 5, at 201. 
[T]he tax accrual workpapers served two purposes. If tax litigation with the 
IRS were not anticipated, the reserves would not be necessary. The litigation 
was not then pending, but the prospect of litigation was present or antici-
pated. But the immediate need for the reserves was to satisfy the auditors and 
to obtain clean financial statements, while the long-term need for the re-
serves was to secure the potential additional tax liability that might arise from 
a tax controversy. 
Id. 
73 See United States v. Textron Inc. (Textron II ), 577 F.3d 21, 34 (1st Cir. 2009) (Torru-
ella, J., dissenting). 
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by equating it to the “for trial” language.74 He argued that because doc-
uments prepared “in anticipation of litigation” were also included in the 
rule, its drafters considered documents prepared “in anticipation of liti-
gation” to be a different, broader category than documents prepared 
“for trial.”75 He asserted that nothing in the rule, the advisory notes, or 
Hickman suggests that protection should be limited to documents cre-
ated for use in trial.76 Limiting the attorney work-product doctrine in 
this way was arguably only consistent with achieving the goals of the 
IRS.77 
B. Policy Considerations and the Internal Revenue Service 
 The IRS’s interest in obtaining access to tax accrual workpapers 
also played a significant role in the holding.78 The court noted, for ex-
ample, that tax avoidance “threatens the essential public interest in 
revenue collection.”79 Some scholars agree with the majority’s applica-
tion of the “because of” test, given public policy considerations.80 One 
commentator notes that courts construe the attorney work-product 
privilege narrowly, especially in the context of IRS investigations.81 
Courts do so because, as the Supreme Court suggested in the 1984 case 
of United States v. Arthur Young & Co., congressional policy favors disclo-
sure of all information relevant to a legitimate IRS inquiry.82 
 Others, however, including Judge Torruella in his dissent, argue 
that the majority’s holding is skewed by one-sided policy considera-
tions.83 The dissent accused the majority of reformulating a new test 
                                                                                                                      
 
74 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A); Textron, 577 F.3d at 34 (Torruella, J., dissenting). 
75 Textron II, 577 F.3d at 34 (Torruella, J., dissenting); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A). 
76 Textron II, 577 F.3d at 34 (Torruella, J., dissenting); see also Claudine Pease-Wingenter, 
Prophetic or Misguided?: The Fifth Circuit’s (Increasingly) Unpopular Approach to the Work Product 
Doctrine, 29 Rev. Litig. 121, 153–61 (2009) (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s “primary purpose” 
rule in light of policy considerations and the text of Rule 26(b)(3) and concluding that a 
textualist construction of the rule such that documents need not be produced to aid or assist 
in trial is consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis of the rule in Hickman). 
77 Textron II, 577 F.3d at 36–37 (Torruella, J., dissenting). 
78 Id. at 31–32 (majority opinion) (“Textron’s work papers were prepared to support 
financial filings and gain auditor approval . . . and IRS access serves the legitimate, and 
important, function of detecting and disallowing abusive tax shelters.”). 
79 Id. at 31. 
80 See Ventry, supra note 64, at 876. 
81 Id. 
82 See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 816 (1984). 
83 See Textron II, 577 F.3d at 32 (Torruella, J., dissenting); see also Tracy Hamilton, Work 
Product Privilege: The Future of Tax Accrual Work Paper Discovery in the Eleventh Circuit After 
Textron, 27 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 729, 754 (2011) (“[T]he for use test also places too much 
emphasis on the potential business purpose . . . at the expense of the protection of impor-
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purely “to assist the IRS in its quest to compel taxpayers to reveal their 
own assessments of their tax returns.”84 Some scholars have similarly 
argued that Textron “reflects the determination of the IRS Commissioner 
to have the judicial system reflect the proper goals and aims involved in 
administering the tax laws.”85 The majority’s goal, according to such 
critics, was to assist the IRS rather than to support Hickman’s policy goal 
of protecting attorneys’ mental impressions concerning litigation where 
those legal opinions may also be used in business decisions.86 
III. The Textron Court’s Major Flaw: Undue Attention  
to the IRS’s Interests 
A. The Interests of the IRS Overly Colored the Majority’s Characterization  
of Tax Accrual Workpapers 
 The Textron majority mistakenly elevated the IRS’s interests over 
those of attorneys in characterizing tax accrual workpapers, and the 
legal opinions on litigation contained therein, as business documents.87 
The opinion cited no authority to support its assertion that no lawyer 
would characterize these documents as having been prepared for a law-
suit.88 Instead, this assertion appeared to flow from the argument of the 
IRS itself that tax accrual workpapers are business documents.89 
 The structure of the majority opinion suggests that the court ig-
nored evidence that did not corroborate the IRS’s testimony.90 For ex-
ample, the majority approvingly cited the testimony of the former chief 
auditor of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board to support 
its conclusion that tax accrual workpapers exist to obtain a clean au-
dit.91 Additionally, in its discussion of the testimony given by Textron’s 
director of tax reporting, the court cited only her statements that sup-
                                                                                                                      
tant legal opinions related to litigation.” (emphasis added)); Jacob A. Kling, Comment, 
Tax Cases Make Bad Work Product Law: The Discoverability of Litigation Risk Assessments After 
United States v. Textron, 119 Yale L.J. 1715, 1718 (2010) (“The majority was motivated by 
concern over the ability of the IRS to detect tax avoidance transactions . . . .”). 
84 See Textron II, 577 F.3d at 32 (Torruella, J., dissenting). 
85 August & Grimes, supra note 10, at 10. 
86 See id. 
87 See United States v. Textron Inc. (Textron II ), 577 F.3d 21, 30 (1st Cir. 2009) (en 
banc); Hoffman & Baltay, supra note 22, at 23. 
88 See Textron II, 577 F.3d at 30. 
89 Id. at 39 (Torruella, J., dissenting) (“[I]n straining to ignore the documents’ litiga-
tion purposes, the majority [relied] heavily on the IRS’s expert.”); see id. at 27 (majority 
opinion). 
90 See id. at 27–28. 
91 See id. at 27. 
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ported the same conclusion.92 The court noted that she discussed liti-
gation in her testimony, but dismissed such statements and simply said 
that “[t]he Textron witnesses, while using the word ‘litigation’ as often 
as possible in their testimony, said the same thing [as the IRS wit-
nesses].”93 The majority also downplayed another Textron witness’s tes-
timony that the workpapers could potentially be helpful in litigation.94 
 The protection that the Textron court destroyed is exactly the ex-
pression of legal opinion that the attorney work-product doctrine was 
created to protect: attorneys’ mental impressions and opinions con-
cerning litigation.95 Although the workpapers may have also been cre-
ated for business purposes, as one commentator has suggests, “‘in the 
case of tax contingency reserves, the prospect of future litigation and 
the business need for the documents are . . . intertwined.’”96 Given that 
tax accrual workpapers in fact provide legal advice and insight and do 
not solely serve a business need, the majority’s blanket assertion to the 
contrary is unconvincing.97 
B. The Textron Test is Tax-Centric and Ignores the Plain Language  
of Rule 26(b)(3) 
 The Textron majority ignored the plain language of Rule 26(b)(3) 
stating that documents made “in anticipation of litigation” constitute 
attorney work-product.98 In so doing, it too narrowly tailored the work-
product rule and failed to consider how the “prepared for” test would 
apply in scenarios other than those where the IRS attempts to discover 
tax avoidance.99 
 The effect of ignoring Rule 26(b)(3)’s plain text and of applying 
the narrow “prepared for” test will likely be felt in litigation outside of 
                                                                                                                      
92 See id. at 27–28. 
93 Id. at 27. 
94 See Textron II, 577 F.3d at 28. 
95 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); Textron II, 577 F.3d at 36 (Torruella, J., dissenting) 
(“Textron’s litigation hazard percentages contain exactly the sort of mental impressions 
about the case that Hickman sought to protect.”); see also Massey, supra note 10, at 11 (not-
ing one attorney’s opinion that “the decision by the en banc court eviscerated the work 
product protection that shielded exactly the type of attorney analysis that was present in 
this case”). 
96 Golodny, supra note 4, at 629 (quoting Terrence G. Perris, Court Applies Work Product 
Privilege to Tax Accrual Workpapers, 80 Prac. Tax Strategies 4 (2008)). 
97 See id.; Massey, supra note 10, at 11. 
98 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A); Textron II, 577 F.3d at 35 (Torruella, J., dissenting). 
99 See Textron II, 577 F.3d at 37 (Torruella, J., dissenting) (“The scope of the work-
product doctrine should not depend on what party is asserting it.”). 
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the context of IRS audits.100 The public policy considerations that ap-
peared to drive the Textron majority’s adoption of the IRS’s argument 
are exclusive to the IRS.101 The First Circuit’s new work-product rule, 
however, essentially gives any adversary access to its opponent’s tax ac-
crual workpapers.102 The IRS may even be the least of a corporation’s 
concerns, because it only requests tax accrual workpapers when com-
panies engage in listed transactions.103 Outside of the audit context, 
other parties may not exercise such restraint when seeking tax accrual 
workpapers or similar risk assessment documents.104 Additionally, the 
Textron decision will likely apply to other documents that, like tax ac-
crual workpapers, have both business and litigation purposes.105 Under 
the Textron rule, a corporation has no work-product protection against 
such requests.106 
Conclusion 
 Corporations must be able to prevent opposing parties in litigation 
from accessing their internal determinations of liabilities and hazard-of-
litigation percentages. In United States v. Textron, Inc., the First Circuit 
joined the Fifth Circuit in holding that tax accrual workpapers are not 
protected by the attorney work-product privilege, removing the last layer 
of protection from discovery for such documents. Although the Textron 
                                                                                                                      
100 See id. (predicting that “the rule announced in this case will, if applied fairly, have 
wide ramifications” beyond the scope of audit litigation); Cosme Caballero, Note, Curbing 
Corporate Abuse from Jurisprudential Off-Sites: Problematic Paradigms in United States v. Textron 
Inc., 65 U. Miami L. Rev. 645, 645 n.4 (2011) (“Various critics of the First Circuit’s deci-
sion have correctly noted that the majority’s decision . . . may have far-reaching effects in 
the private and public sectors.” (internal citations omitted)); Sarah Seifert Mallet, Case-
note, Work-Product Doctrine—The First Circuit Further Confuses an Existing Circuit Split in Unit-
ed States v. Textron Inc., 63 SMU L. Rev. 251, 256 (2010) (noting Textron’s “sweeping con-
sequences” for “tax litigation, discovery disputes, and corporate attorneys”). 
101 See Textron II, 577 F.3d at 36 (Torruella, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority’s 
policy analysis “relie[d] . . . on case-specific rationales”); RIA, supra note 12, ¶ T-1330. 
102 See RIA, supra note 12, ¶ T-1330 (observing that “under the [Textron “prepared for”] 
test, every party in litigation (not only IRS or state taxing authorities) whose opponent files 
generally accepted accounting principles financial statements reporting contingent liabili-
ties for litigation exposure would be able to discover the hazards-of-litigation analysis of its 
opponent’s attorneys.”). 
103 Jones, supra note 5, at 203. 
104 Id.; see August & Grimes, supra note 10, at 27. 
105 See August & Grimes, supra note 10, at 27 (“Some legal advisors may view the analy-
sis in Textron as more darkly asserting a broad impact on the issue of documents and mem-
oranda in a company’s files pertaining to all liability reserves, not just tax reserves.”); 
Jones, supra note 5, at 203; Mallet, supra note 100, at 256. 
106 Jones, supra note 5, at 203; see Textron II, 577 F.3d at 26. 
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decision supports the IRS in its legitimate goal of discovering corporate 
tax shelters, it undermines the broader purpose behind the attorney 
work-product privilege. Rule 26(b)(3) exists to protect the opinions and 
mental impressions expressed in tax accrual workpapers, documents 
that are now subject to discovery in the First Circuit by any opposing 
party in litigation. Future circuits considering the status of tax accrual 
workpapers should avoid giving the IRS’s interests undue weight and 
ensure that these documents receive robust work-product protection. 
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